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Abstract. The paper analyzes coalition formation in Dutch municipalities. After discussing the 
main features of the institutional setting, several theories are discussed, which are classified as size 
oriented, policy oriented and actor oriented models. A test statistic is proposed to determine the 
predictive power of these models. The empirical analysis shows that strategic positions as well as 
some of the distinguished preferences are important in the setting of Dutch municipalities. 
Especially, the dominant minimum number principle yields highly significant results for coalition 
formations in the period 1978-1986. 
1. Introduction 
Most empirical studies on coalition theories use data on cabinet formation for 
central governments. Well-known examples are the studies of Browne (1970), 
De Swaan (1973) and Taylor and Laver (1973). Recently empirical evidence 
for this level of government was reported in Peleg (1981), Browne and Dreij- 
manis (1982), Browne, Gleiber and Mashoba (1984) and Schofield (1987). 
Less attention is paid to the formation of coalitions in local governments. In 
Mellors and Pijnenburg (1989) qualitative analyses are found for coalition 
formation in local government in various European countries. Laver, Rallings 
and Thrasher (1987) provided some insights for local government in Britain. 
Boute (1988) tested several hypotheses for Belgian municipalities and found 
highly significant predictions for the set of size oriented models. Denters 
(1985: 305) conducted a test for larger Dutch municipalities; he did not find 
any significant results at all, but this might be due to an inappropriate test 
statistic that was used.' Further, Denters tested only a few hypotheses for a 
relatively small number of municipalities. In this paper, tests of the predictive 
power of size oriented models, policy oriented models and actor oriented 
models of local government formation are reported for a larger number of 
municipalities and for several points in time. 
With regard to coalition formations in Dutch municipalities, several ques- 
tions can be raised. Are size oriented models more appropriate, as in the 
Belgian case, or do we find better results for policy oriented models, as 
Franklin and Mackie (1984: 686) found for Dutch cabinet formations? Is it true 
that coalition theories are not able to explain coalition formation in Dutch 
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local government, as Denters concluded, or does it turn out that certain 
theories can explain this phenomenon when an appropriate test statistic is 
used? To what extent can the more recently suggested models predict the 
outcomes of formation processes? Beside these questions the most important 
one is, of course: Which insights can be provided by a test of coalition theories 
at the local level? 
Before turning to the setting of Dutch local government, a distinction has to 
be made with respect to the rules used in the formation process, which are 
neglected in previous studies. If all players are allowed to propose some 
coalition at the same time, a formation process is called unrestricted. This 
implies that no one can be excluded from the agenda, and that no rule governs 
the sequence of alternatives presented to the other players. A formation 
process is called restricted if only one player is allowed to choose some action, 
such as to propose a coalition. 
Formation processes also differ with respect to the extent to which players 
are able to affect the outcome. Cabinet formations in The Netherlands are 
governed by several informal rules. First, the Queen appoints one of the party 
leaders to investigate ‘the possibilities of forming a coalition’ after consulting 
all political parties represented in the new parliament. Second, the leaders of 
the parties in parliament ‘negotiate’ their inclusion in a majority coalition 
under ‘the more or less active leadership of the formateur’ (De Swaan, 1982: 
221). Third, theformateur, as a member of one of the main parties, can freely 
operate without being accountable to parliament. In his study of cabinet 
formations in the period 1959-1973 Maas (1982: 375) observes that the forma- 
teur ‘. . .actually decides on vital national issues such as basis, programme and 
composition of a future cabinet. Also, his personal views and wishes can play a 
role, without parliament being able to do much about it’ (translated from 
Dutch). Thus, the formateur arrangement provides one of the political parties 
in particular with the opportunity to influence coalition formation. Moreover, 
this arrangement also suggests that the coalition formation process at the 
national level in the Netherlands can be characterized as restricted. 
At the local level there is a different arrangement, which has its roots in the 
local political system.2 Formally, the sovereign body of a Dutch municipality is 
the municipal council. Its members are elected in general elections for periods 
of four years. Municipal policies are prepared and proposed by an executive 
committee, which is called the Council of Mayor and Aldermen. The Mayor is 
appointed by the central government for a period of six years.3 All Aldermen 
are elected by the municipal council from among its members using simple 
majority rule. 
After the elections all political parties in the municipal council start negotia- 
tions to determine the political composition of the Council of Mayor and 
Aldermen. Contrary to formation processes at the national level, noformateur 
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is appointed and parties directly bargain among each other to be represented 
in the executive body. Under this arrangement any party may propose some 
‘coalition’ of the members of the municipal council to be appointed as Alder- 
men, and none of these proposals is excluded from the ‘formal’ agenda. Of 
course, depending on some behavioural model, political parties may prefer to 
form a coalition with specific players. Thus, contrary to cabinet formations, 
the formation of a Council of Mayor and Aldermen in the Netherlands can be 
typified as an unrestricted process. 
Different institutional arrangements may affect the outcome of formation 
processes. Outcomes of restricted processes can be influenced by the player 
with a mandate to form a government. Recall, for instance, Maas’ observation 
for cabinet formations in the Netherlands. At the local level this mechanism is 
absent, and strategies of all players will be much more important. However, 
giving attention to institutional arrangements does not imply that the prefer- 
ences of participants can be neglected. Institutional arrangements only deter- 
mine the context in which a player makes his or her choice. This choice itself 
has to be based on some behavioural model. Thus, the motivations stressed by 
policy and size or office-oriented models might also be needed to explain 
coalition formation. 
Given this, we need to ask whether office or policy considerations are 
expected to be dominant in the context of Dutch local government. In the 
Netherlands, the policies of local governments are mainly determined by the 
central government. Municipalities, for example, have to cope with centrally 
enforced regulation and receive most of their revenues from the central 
government. Furthermore, the central government uses municipalities to 
carry out most of its policies. Beside giving local government limited ability to 
develop and implement local policies, the importance of the central govern- 
ment also results in an orientation of voters towards primarily national policy 
issues instead of local ones (see Denters, 1985: 296; Kuiper & Tops, 1989: 227). 
One of the consequences of this is that local politicians are rarely held respons- 
ible for their policies. Policy considerations, therefore, may play a minor role 
in local coalition formation in the Netherlands: office considerations will be 
much more important. Thus, in the context of local government in the Nether- 
lands, preferences presumed by office-oriented models are expected to ex- 
plain coalition formation better than preferences presumed by policy oriented 
models. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the so-called size, 
policy and actor oriented models. In this section, hypotheses are derived about 
coalition formation. In Section 3 additional assumptions are introduced in 
order to test these hypotheses in the context of Dutch local government. 
Attention is paid to local lists and the ordering of parties on a policy scale. In 
Section 4 statistical tests for the predictive power of coalition theories are 
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discussed. The results of the empirical analysis are reported in Section 5 .  
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Theories 
Models of coalition formation can be distinguished into (1) size or office 
oriented models, (2) policy oriented models, and (3) actor oriented models. 
Size and policy oriented models presume some behavioural model of bargain- 
ing between players to derive hypotheses about coalition formation. On the 
other hand, actor oriented models focus on the position of some particular 
player in a bargaining process. 
To discuss the various models, some simple notation is needed. Let N = {I, 
2 ,3 ,  . . .n}  be a set of n players in a voting body. A coalition S is any subset of 
N .  Define W as the set of winning coalitions. Coalitions not in W are called 
losing coalitions. If votes are unequally distributed among the players, a 
weight can be assigned to each player i, i E N ,  which represents the number of 
available votes, denoted as w(i).  The number of votes controlled by a coalition 
S, or its weight, is defined as: w(S) = 1 w(i) , S G N with w(i) summed over all i, 
i ES.  The minimum number of votes that is sufficient to adopt a proposal is 
called a quotum, denoted as q. Now, a coalition S is an element of the set of 
winning coalitions W if w(S) 3 q.  Further, a coalition Tis an element of the set 
of losing coalitions L if this condition is not satisfied. In other words: T E L  if 
w(T) < q. For coalition formations in the Dutch local political system simple 
majority rule is used. So, in this paper, q is defined as: 
(1 w(i) + 1)/2 < q < 1 w(i)/2 + 1, 
where q is an element of the set of integers and w(i) is summed over all i E N. 
Furthermore, in the context of Dutch municipalities players are to be consid- 
ered as political parties. The seats of these parties in the municipal council 
determine their weights. 
2.1 Size oriented models 
Size oriented models assume that political parties are exclusively interested in 
the benefits of being in office, which are often conceived as membership of 
government, cabinet portfolios or variables related with the control of depart- 
ments. To be sure of the highest possible ‘payoff, coalitions should be as small 
as possible. In contrast to policy oriented models these models do not take into 
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account policy considerations, which may be important for the re-election of 
political parties. The size oriented models are distinguished into minimum 
number winning principle, minimum size principle and minimum number 
principle. The latter two can be regarded as extensions of the first principle. 
Minimum winning principle (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1974 [ 19441). 
The set of minimum winning coalitions, denoted by Wm, is defined as follows: 
w" = {S E W I for all i E S, S - {i} E L}. 
If, however, S - { i }  E W ,  then a party i is called an unneccessary actor in 
coalition S. Assuming that (1) coalition formation is of a constant sum, in other 
words the net-benefits for all winning coalitions are constant, and (2) the 
benefits for each winning coalition are independent of the number of mem- 
bers, it can be deduced that political parties will form winning coalitions that 
do not contain unnecessary actors. 
HYPOTHESIS I:  In a formation process, only coalitions from W"' will be 
f ~ r m e d . ~  
Minimum size principle (Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962).5 The set of minimum 
size coalitions, denoted by Ws, is defined as: 
W = { S E W 1 for all T E W, T # S, w(S) 9 w(T)}. 
Concerning the distribution of 'payoffs' it is assumed that the members of a 
winning coalition divide the benefits of forming such a coalition proportionally 
to their weights (see Gamson, 1961: 376). So, political parties try to form 
coalitions without unnecessary actors that also have the smallest weight. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: In a formation process, only coalitions from Ws will be 
formed. 
Minimum number principle (Leiserson, 1968). The set of minimum number 
coalitions, denoted by W, is defined as follows: 
W" = { S E W I for all T E W, T # S, m(S) 9 m(T) }. 
with m(S) as the number of political parties that are member of coalition S. 
This model assumes that the costs of decision making within a coalition 
increase with the number of members. Given this assumption, parties strive to 
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form coalitions that are minimum winning and contain the smallest number of 
actors. In accordance with De Swaan (1973: 65-7) the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: In a formation process, only coalitions from W will be 
formed. 
2.2 Policy oriented models 
If voters determine their party choice on the extent to which a party has kept its 
promises in the previous government period, political parties are to be expect- 
ed to give preference to coalitions which are as ideologically cohesive as 
possible (minimum range theory or minimum diversity theory) or as close as 
possible to its own policy position (policy distance theory). In that case 
political parties have the highest chance of achieving their own policy ob- 
jectives and secure the support of their electorate. As indicated in the in- 
troduction, the behavioral presumption of this class of models is expected to be 
less appropriate for the context of Dutch municipalities than the one of size 
oriented models. 
Depending on the dimensionality of the ideological space of politics the 
policy oriented models are distinguished into one-dimensional and mulfi- 
dimensional models.6 In this paper the attention is restricted to one-dimen- 
sional models because multidimensional data for local politics in the Nether- 
lands are not available. In Section 3.3 a dominant policy dimension will be 
proposed assuming that local branches of national political parties are restrict- 
ed in formulating their own policy objectives. 
Axelrod’s Conflictof Znferest theory will not be tested (Axelrod, 1970). This 
theory ‘predicts’ closed minimum winning coalitions (or closed minimum 
range coalitions in De Swaan’s terminology), which should minimize the 
conflict of interest among their members. However, this set of coalitions can 
not be deduced from Axelrod’s assumptions as Taylor (1972) and, later, De 
Swaan (1973: 77) indicated. Thus, large numbers of connected coalitions, 
which are frequently found in empirical research, do not necessarily support 
Axelrod’s hypothesis. Moreover, Browne, Gleiber and Mashoba (1984: 25), 
who performed an alternative test based on cardinal measures of the policy 
positions of political parties, concluded that Axelrod’s theory is ‘. . .insuffi- 
cient to explain the formation and duration of cabinet formations’. 
Minimum range principle (Leiserson, 1966; De Swaan, 1973: 71-5). Assume 
that the ideological cohesiveness of a coalition is determined by its range: The 
smaller this range, the greater is the cohesiveness. Assume an ordinal policy 
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scale for which the policy position of each political party is indicated by an 
ordinal number pi. The range of a coalition can be determined by the policy 
position of its extreme members. De Swaan defines the range of a coalition S, 
denoted by D(S),  as: 
with p ;  as the policy position of the left most party (pLs S pi, for all i E S) and 
p ;  as the policy position of the right most party of S (pRs 2 pi, for all i E S). The 
range of a coalition T, T # S, is larger than the range of S if: 
PL' < pLs and pRT 3 pRs 
or 
P L ~  s pLS and pRT > pRs, 
and is equal if 
P L ~  = pLs and pRT = PRs* 
However, it is not always possible to determine whether the range of a 
coalition is greater (or smaller) than the range of another coalition. If such a 
comparison cannot be made, both coalitions are admitted to the prediction set. 
The set of minimum range coalitions, denoted by Wa" is defined as: 
W'," = { S E W I for all T E W, T # S, D(S) d D(T) or D(S) 3 D(T) }. 
If political parties prefer coalitions that are as ideologically cohesive as pos- 
sible, they will strive to form a governing coalition that has the smallest range 
possible. Thus: 
HYPOTHESIS 4:In a formation process, only coalitions from W ' s "  will be 
formed. 
If a policy scale is interpreted as an interval scale (see De Swaan, 1973: 75), the 
set of minimum range coalitions can be defined as: 
Wi= { S E W  I fora l lTE W, T # S, A(S) s A(T) }, 
with A(S) as: 
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In this case p ,  is to be considered as a cardinal number. This version of the 
minimum range principle leads to the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 5: In a formation process, only coalitions from W’ will be 
formed. 
Minimum diversiv principle (Leiserson, 1966; Taylor & Laver, 1973: 217). In 
contrast to the minimum range principle the ideological cohesiveness of a 
coalition can also be determined by a diversity measure proposed by Leiserson 
(1966: 343-4). The ideological diversity, ZD(S), of a coalition S is defined as 
the number of ‘spaces’ and ‘holes’ separating the coalition members for a 
specific ranking of players. For example, using the ranking pi  < pi < pk for i ,  j 
and k ,  the ideological diversity of coalition { i ,  j }  is equal to one (one space, no 
holes), ID { i ,  j ,  k} = 2 (two spaces, no holes), and ID { i ,  k} = 3 (two spaces, 
one hole). The set of minimum diversity coalitions, lVd, is defined as follows: 
Wid= { S E W I for all T E W, T # S, ZD(S) d ID(T) }. 
If political parties prefer ideological cohesive coalitions, they will try to form 
coalitions that are the less diverse. This principle leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 6: In a formation process, only coalitions from W.d will be 
formed. 
Subjective policy distance principle (De Swaan, 1973; Boute, 1981, 1984). 
According to the policy distance theory political parties prefer a winning 
coalition as close as possible to their own policy positions. In its original 
formulation (see De Swaan, 1973: 80-104) these distances are regarded as 
‘objective’ entities, that is, they are seen as being equal for all political parties. 
Boute (1981) showed that it is not always possible to determine these distances 
unambiguously using De Swaan’s assumptions. For instance, two ‘pivotal’ 
parties can be identified within the same coalition causing such a coalition to 
appear twice in the preference ordering of its members. Boute (1984) has 
proposed a re-formulation of De Swaan’s theory towards a ‘subjective’ ver- 
sion. Beside ‘subjective’ distances with respect to winning coalitions, each 
party is assumed to neglect a second identical coalition within its ‘subjective’ 
ordering. This version of the theory will be tested in this paper. 
Let U be the set of undominated coalitions to be determined by the assump- 
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tions introduced by Boute (1984: 125-6). Then, the set of policy distance 
minimizing coalitions, denoted by WPd, is defined as follows: 
WPd= { S E W I S E U } .  
In some cases, however, it is not clear whether coalitions are dominated or not. 
A political party may find coalitions to its ‘left’ and its ‘right’ for which it is not 
possible to compare policy ‘distances’ using an ordinal policy scale. This 
problem leads to a so-called ‘forked preference ordering’ (see De Swaan, 1973: 
106), which may result in the impossibility to determine whether a specific 
coalition is dominated. The set of coalitions to which this problem applies, is 
called the set of undetermined coalitions, U’. So, a second prediction set can 
be defined including these undetermined coalitions: 
Within the scope of the subjective policy distance theory the following two 
hypotheses are proposed: 
HYPOTHESIS 7: In a formation process, only coalitions from WsPd will be 
formed. 
HYPOTHESIS 8: In a formation process, only coalitions from WSPd,” will be 
formed. 
2.3 Actor oriented models 
The third category of models tries to explain the formation of governing 
coalitions using certain properties of specific political parties. These properties 
proceed from different notions of power. For example, a party can be consid- 
ered as powerful if he is a dictator within a coalition and, in addition, if he is 
able to form a winning coalition with oppositional parties while this is not 
feasible for the other coalition members (‘dominant player’). Another aspect 
of power is involved if a party is pivotal within an ideological space (‘central 
player’). Within this class of models powerful actors are expected to affect 
coalition formation. 
Dominant player principle (Peleg, 1981; Van Deemen, 1989). A ‘dominant’ 
player, such as a political party, is assumed to have power to be decisive with 
respect to the choice of the governing coalition. Domination is defined as 
follows. A player i weakly dominates a coalition S,  S E W, i E S, if for every 
coalition B, B E N - S, the following condition holds: 
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(1) if B U S-  { i }  E W ,  then B U { i }  E W .  
Thus, if the internal opposition of player i can win with one or more players in 
B ,  then these players must also be able to win with i, if player i is to be said to 
dominate coalition S weakly. However, a player i dominates a coalition S, S E 
W, i E S, if, in addition to condition (l) ,  there are coalitions B, B E N - S ,  such 
that the following condition holds as well: 
(2) if B U {i} E W ,  then B U S-  {i} E L .  
If player i can win with B,  but S - { i }  cannot, then this player dominates 
coalition S. This player, who satisfies condition (1) as well as condition (2), is 
called a dominant player. A coalition formation process with a dominant 
player is called a dominated formation process. 
Peleg (1981: 13) showed that the set of dominant players is at most one 
player in weighted majority games.’ The dominant player is able to form 
winning coalitions with parties that are oppositional to that coalition, while the 
other coalition members cannot form winning coalitions with them. Van 
Deemen (1989: 323) proved that the dominant player is a dictator in the 
coalition he dominates. So, the dominant player can be regarded as a powerful 
player in the formation process, especially if he is given a mandate to form a 
governing coalition.8 Therefore, it is expected that in dominated games only 
coalitions with the dominant player are formed. 
Let WdsW be the set of weakly dominated coalitions, Wd the set of dominated 
coalitions, and i the dominant player. Both sets are defined as follows: 
WdsW = { S E W 1 i weakly dominates S } 
and: 
Wd= { S E W I i dominates S } 
Applying the dominant player principle to the formation of coalitions between 
political parties, the following hypotheses are proposed (see Peleg, 1981: 18; 
Van Deemen, 1989: 324). 
HYPOTHESIS 9: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from Wd.w 
will be formed. 
HYPOTHESIS 10: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from Wd 
will be formed. 
Weak domination is a rather limited concept of power. It is, therefore, 
255 
expected that hypothesis 10 explains coalition formation better than hypothe- 
sis 9. Also note that hypothesis 10 is more restrictive than hypothesis 9 because 
Wd E W"W & w. 
Centralplayerprinciple (Einy 1985,109; Van Deemen, 1990: 190-2). A player 
is central in a policy order, if all the other players to its left or to its right can 
only form a winning coalition with this player. More precisely, a player i is 
called a central player if, given a ranking of players: 
(1) L(i, N )  U {i} E Wand L(i, N) E L, and if 
( 2 )  R(i, N )  U { i }  E Wand R(i, N) E L ,  
with L(i, iV) as the set of players to the left of is policy position, and R(i, N) as 
the set of players to the right of i .  If a game is proper (the complement of a 
winning coalition is always losing) and strong (the complement of a losing 
coalition is always winning), then a central player exists, and it is proven to be 
only one player (Van Deemen, 1990: 191). If a central player occurs, a 
formation process is called a centralized process. 
Because of his position the central player can assure himself of a majority, or 
prevent a hostile majority from forming. In this respect the central player is a 
powerful player, who can influence the outcome of the formation process. 
Consequently, in centralized games only coalitions with the central player will 
be formed. 
An implicit assumption of this model is that players have some policy 
preference and, therefore, do not pass the central player on the policy scale 
with respect to coalition formations. Thus, the central player principle mixes a 
strategic consideration with policy preferences. As indicated in the introduc- 
tion, such a model is expected to work better in the context of Dutch munici- 
palities than models only emphasizing one of these features. However, policy 
preferences are expected to be less appropriate for the studied setting because 
of the primarily 'national' orientation of voters, which reduces the potential 
usefulness of this model. 
If the political party i is a central player, the following set of 'centralized' 
coalitions, W', can be defined: 
W' = { S E W I i is central in the policy order and i E S }, 
leading to the following hypothesis (see Roozendaal, 1989: 262): 
HYPOTHESIS I I : In a centralized formation process, only coalitions from Wc 
will be formed. 
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Combinations. Several combinations of actor oriented models are suggested of 
which the following combinations are tested in this paper: 
Dominant central player principle (Roozendaal, 1989). In some cases the 
dominant player is also a central player. This combination of powerful posi- 
tions and the presumed policy preferences of political parties leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 12: In a formation process for which the dominant player is 
equal to the central player, only coalitions from Wd n Wc will be formed. 
Dominated minimum winning principle. The combination of the dominant 
player principle and the minimum winning principle holds the following hy- 
potheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 13: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from 
WdrW n w" will be formed. 
HYPOTHESIS 14: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from 
Wd n Wm will be formed. 
Dominated minimum size principle (Van Deemen, 1989: 325-8). This combi- 
nation of principles has led to the following hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 15: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from 
Wd*w n Ws will be formed. 
HYPOTHESIS 16:In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from 
Wd n Ws will be formed. 
Dominated minimum number principle. The combination of the dominant 
player principle and the minimum number principle yields the following 
hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 17: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from 
Wd.'" n W will be formed. 
HYPOTHESIS 18: In a dominated formation process, only coalitions from 
Wd n W" will be formed. 
3. Council of Mayor and Aldermen in Dutch municipalities and the intended 
test of the hypotheses 
In Dutch municipal councils, political parties are represented on a proportion- 
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al basis. As a consequence more than two political parties are represented in 
most councils. After the 1986 elections, for example, the average number of 
political parties represented was 4.8.” Frequently no single party has a major- 
ity of the seats, so a coalition of parties has to form the Council of Mayor and 
Aldermen. 
The political parties represented in municipal councils can be distinguished 
into national lists and local lists (Dittrich, 1978: 19). National lists are local 
branches of national political parties. They include parties such as the ‘Chris- 
tian Democrats’ (CDA), the ‘Labor Party’ (PvdA) and the ‘Liberal Party’ 
(VVD),” and specific combinations of local branches of national parties. An 
example of the latter is the ‘Progressive Alliance’ (PAK), which consists of 
varying combinations of PvdA, D’66, PPR, PSP and CPN. Local lists do not 
have a national counterpart and they are typically bound to a specific munici- 
pality. These lists embody various political groupings with different policy 
preferences. l2 
The Council of Mayor and Aldermen, as the municipal executive commit- 
tee, dominates the municipal council with regard to decision making (Denters 
and Kerver, 1981: 346-347). This implies that, if a political party is not 
represented in this body, it misses an important basis of influence on local 
policies. Further, positions of Aldermen provide local politicians with prestige 
and, mainly in larger municipalities, well-paid jobs. 
To test the hypotheses derived in the preceding section, three assumptions 
have to be introduced regarding (1) the measurement of political support, (2) 
the position of the appointed Mayor, and (3) the policy positions of the various 
local parties. 
3.1 Support of coalitions 
Only political parties represented in the Council of Mayor and Aldermen are 
assumed to support the governing coalition. This assumption may be problem- 
atic for the smallest municipalities. In those cases only two positions as 
Alderman are available, as determined by law. Because of the rather limited 
number of seats, it is possible that not all supporting political parties are 
represented in the executive committee. Consequently, the inclusion of these 
municipalities will lead to a biased test in favor of size oriented models and 
especially the minimum number principle. Because of this problem the pro- 
posed hypotheses will be tested for different groups of municipalities depend- 
ing on the available number of positions of Aldermen. 
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3.2 The Mayor 
Although the Mayor is an appointed member of the Council of Mayor and 
Aldermen, he also is a member of one of the national political parties. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that political parties take the Mayor’s party 
affiliation into account when they distribute the available positions of Alder- 
men. For this reason two variants will be distinguished in Section 5: Thefirst 
variant bases the governing coalition on the party membership of Aldermen 
alone; the second variant uses the party membership of the Aldermen as well 
as the Mayor to determine the parties represented in the coalition. 
3.3 Policy positions of local parties 
Another question to be dealt with concerns the ideological positions of local 
political parties. As indicated earlier, empirical research on the policy posi- 
tions of these parties is absent. Therefore, we construct a policy ordering of 
parties. 
With respect to national parties it is likely that their local policy positions do 
not much differ from their positions at national level. As indicated in the 
introduction, local government in the Netherlands is more or less dependent 
on the central government. This dependency suggest that differences in pol- 
icies between the two levels of government should be very limited.13 Further, 
this situation also implies that the same policy dimensions may be involved in 
local as well as in national politics. 
Given identical policy dimensions, there are at least two reasons to expect 
that local branches of national parties do not deviate from policy positions of 
their national counterparts. First, within a municipality both the local branch 
and the national party share the same electorate. If voters notice different 
policy positions, or ‘inconsistencies’, a party may lose the confidence of voters, 
leading to a loss of electoral support. Therefore, the national party and the 
local branches have a strong incentive to maintain identical policy positions. 
Second, another incentive arises if careers of local politicians are considered. 
These politicians may aim at positions in the national party apparatus, or at 
political positions at central government level or the level of provinces. A 
deviation from the national party-line will decrease the candidate’s support 
within the party, reducing his chances of being promoted. This mechanism also 
leads to more or less identical policy positions for different local branches of 
the same national party. Summarizing this argument, it is expected that: 
(1) the policy dimensions on which parties can be ordered are the same for 
( 2 )  the ordering of local parties on this scale is identical between municipal- 
local and central government, and 
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ities,14 and can be derived from the ordering of political parties at the 
national 1e~el.I~ 
Using these expectations as assumptions, local branches of national parties can 
be ordered in the national policy space. 
The ordering of national political parties in the Netherlands using elections 
manifestos is analyzed in several studies (see for example Lipschits, 1969: 
104-16; Dittrich, 1987). In most studies it appeared that politics in the Nether- 
lands is dominated by one dimension interpreted in terms of social economic 
problems. Dittrich, who recently analyzed the content of election manifestos 
with factor analysis, interpreted the most important factor as the ‘traditional’ 
social economic dimension (1987: 223). Using Dittrich’s results the following 
ordering of national political parties is proposed.16 
SP RPF 
PSP GPV CP 
CPN PPR PvdA D’66 CDA VVD SGP BP 
1 I 1 I I I I left I right [l] 
I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
The ordering of extreme parties differs sometimes in empirical research. For 
this reason the same policy positions are assumed for PSP and CPN, for SGP, 
GPV and RPF, and for CP and BP.” 
Concerning the elections of 1982 the ordering of parties on Dittrich’s most 
important factor changed with respect to D’66. This party is found on the left 
side of PvdA instead of the right side. This effect can be caused by issues 
related to democracy,18 which are strongly emphasized by D’66 and positively 
related with the ‘social economic’ factor in Dittrich’s study.19 Because of this 
empirical problem, an alternative ordering of parties will be used as well, 
which takes into account the ambiguous position of D’66. This alternative is: 
SP RPF 
PSP GPV CP 
CPN PPR D’66 PvdA CDA VVD SGP BP 
I I 1 I I I I 
I I I I I right [2] left 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
Thus, orderings [l] and [2] will be considered as different variants of a policy 
ordering of political parties. These orderings are alternative specifications and 
not dimensions of the same policy space. 
The positions of combinations of national lists, and in some cases also 
combinations of national and local lists, are not known yet. These combina- 
260 
tions are imputed to the largest party viewed from a national perspective. 
Combinations of GPV and/or SGP and/or RPF are labelled PCG (‘Protestant 
Christian Groups’), and these combinations are attributed to the position of 
these parties. Further, the already mentioned PAK-lists are distinguished 
into: (1) PAK-1, they are combinations of CPN, PSP, PPR and/or D’66 with 
PvdA; these combinations are attributed to the policy position of PvdA, (2) 
PAK-2 or combinations without PvdA, but with D’66; these lists are imputed 
to the position of D’66, and (3) PAK-3 or combinations of PPR, PSP and/or 
CPN, which are attributed to the position of PPR. For example, ordering [l] 
can be extended as follows: 
PCG 
SP RPF 
PSP PAK-3 PAK-1 PAK-2 GPV CP 
CPN PPR PvdA D’66 CDAVVD SGP BP 
I I I I I I I left I right [l’] 
I I I I I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
Information on policy positions of local lists is not available. In the south of the 
Netherlands local lists are often classified as Roman Catholic lists, but this 
label does not imply that these groupings share equal positions (see, for 
instance, Dittrich, 1983). Moreover, it is questionable whether the positions of 
Roman Catholic lists coincide with the policy position of the Christian demo- 
cratic CDA as Denters (1985: 301) assumed. Because of their unknown policy 
positions municipalities with local lists should be excluded when the policy 
oriented models and the central player principle are tested. This principle 
would lead to the exclusion of a large number of cases, even when local lists 
occupy a relatively small number of seats in the municipal council, which 
points to a trade-off between reliability and the number of cases for which 
coalition theories are tested. The larger the number of municipalities with a 
relatively high proportion of local lists that is included in the analysis, the 
higher the degree of information owing to a larger number of cases, but the 
lower the reliability of the analysis because of the unknown policy positions of 
these lists. This trade-off is visualized in Figure 1. The vertical axis gives the 
cumulative, relative number of municipalities ordered to the proportion of 
seats of local lists, while the proportion of seats of local lists is depicted on the 
horizontal axis. 
In a substantial number of municipalities the relative number of seats of 
local lists is small. Given the trade-off between information and reliability a 
point is sought for which an increase of the proportion of local lists does not 
lead to a substantial increase of the number of cases. Such a point is found at 
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% municipalities 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 I I I I 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
X seats of local lists 
- 1986 1982 1978 
Fig. 1. Shares of seats of local lists in municipal councils and the cumulative number of municipal- 
ities, which are ordered to their share of local lists (in percentages). 
20% of the seats in Figure 1 . * O  Therefore, we omit local lists in the analysis if 
they occupy 20% or less of the seats in the municipal council. Municipalities 
are excluded from our analysis if local lists have more than 20% of the seats at 
their disposal in the municipal council. Furthermore, if a local list is repre- 
sented in the Council of Mayor and Aldermen the municipality is excluded as 
well. 
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4. Statistical tests for the predictive power of coalition theories 
The results of empirical analyses of coalition formation are often presented as 
the number of correct predictions (see for example Peleg, 1981; Roozendaal, 
1989; Van Deemen, 1990) or ‘success Such a presentation has several 
limitations. First, the number of predicted coalitions are often larger than one, 
while ‘success rates’ do not account for the number of coalitions in the 
prediction set. In that case the most successful theory would be the ‘naive’ 
theory predicting all possible coalitions. In other words, the prediction of the 
correct coalition is not a sufficient condition to judge the empirical validity of a 
theory. A neccessary condition is precision, which ideally implies that the 
prediction set should only contain the coalition that is actually formed. Sec- 
ond, and in connection with the preceding point, using ‘success rates’ it is not 
clear whether the prediction made by theory is better than a random choice 
between all possible coalitions. 
Several test statistics have been suggested to determine the predictive power 
of coalition theories. These tests depart from the notion that the number of 
successful predictions should be higher than a random selection of coalitions 
from the set of all possible coalitions. Mokken (see De Swaan, 1973: 304-7) 
suggested determining the probability of a correct prediction for each inter- 
election period. According to his assumptions this probability can be described 
with a hypergeometric distribution. Further, the results of these tests for the k 
inter-election periods are combined in an overall statistic originally proposed 
by Fisher. This overall statistic follows a chi-square distribution with 2k 
degrees of freedom. 
Taylor and Laver (1973: 217-21) modified Mokken’s test statistic in several 
aspects. Mokken restricted the set of possible coalitions to winning coalitions 
for computing probabilities, while Taylor and Laver also included all losing 
coalitions. Mokken assumed that coalitions are drawn randomly without 
replacement, while Taylor and Laver suggested a random sample with replace- 
ment. In that case the probability of being selected follows the binomial 
distribution. Laver and Taylor corrected the overall test statistics for disconti- 
nuity. However, even if a correction for discontinuity is used, it is doubtful 
whether the suggested overall statistic follows a chi-square distribution (see 
Kincaid, 1962) because of the very limited number of values for the binomial 
variable (in this paper the number of successes only has two values, that is: 0 or 
An alternative to the test statistics of Taylor, Laver and Mokken is suggest- 
ed by Gamson (1962: 166-7) and, recently, independently of Gamson reported 
by Boute (1988: 155-9). They consider the number of successes for the various 
coalition formations within the k inter-election periods as drawn from the 
same population. If the number of cases is relatively large, the central-limit 
1). 
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theorem can be used to determine the probability distribution. This solution is 
also followed in this paper. 
Let n be the number of cases, or municipalities, and ri, i E { I ,  2 , 3 .  . .n}, the 
number of coalitions in the prediction set for case i .  The number of winning 
coalitions for the same case is denoted as ti. The probability of a correct 
prediction for case i is: 
pi = r,/ti. 
Subsequently, the number of correct predictions for municipality i will be 
denoted as si, which has only two values (one if the prediction is correct, or nil 
if the prediction is not correct). 
The number of possible coalitions is limited to winning coalitions. Taylor 
and Laver, however, also included losing coalitions to thisset. This approach is 
not followed for several reasons. First, most models considered in Section 2 are 
based on simple game theory assuming that the complement of a winning 
coalition is a losing one. In those cases it is not appropriate to test the proposed 
hypotheses for the formation of minority governments for which the comple- 
ment of a winning coalition can be a winning coalition. Second, Taylor and 
Laver motivated their choice by pointing out that they also considered the set 
of winning coalitions as a ‘hypothesis’. But, in this way they confuse a criterion 
used in simple game theory with theoretical hypotheses proposed in several 
models within that approach. Furthermore, enlargement of the set of possible 
coalitions may lead to an overestimation of the predictive power of coalition 
theories. 
Given the probability of selecting a correct coalition the following null- 
hypothesis will be tested for each theory: 
H,: 1 pi 2 1 si 
with p i  and si summed over all cases i E {I, 2, 3 . . .n}. The alternative 
hypothesis is: 
which indicates that the prediction of a specific theory is better than a random 
selection of a coalition. 
Using the central-limit theorem it is generally known that, when the number 
of cases becomes large,23 the binomial distribution may be approximated by 
the normal distribution with an expected number of successes equal to pi and 
variance equal to 1 pi(I-pi). The condition of a large number of cases is 
sufficiently fulfilled in the empirical analysis, which mostly uses approximately 
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a hundred cases or more. The hypotheses derived in Section 2 will be tested for 
the (relevant) population of Dutch municipalities. The test statistic Z, which 
uses population parameters, can be computed as follows24 (see Gamson, 1962: 
167): 
The higher this Z-value, the smaller the probability that a theory gives a false 
prediction. For Z a level of significance can be obtained from the normal table. 
The hypotheses are tested using a 1%-level of significance and a one-tailed 
test.25 Moreover, the Z-values of different hypotheses follow the same distri- 
bution, and, therefore, they can be easily compared. The higher the Z-value of 
a significant hypothesis, the better the prediction of this theory compared with 
other theories. 
5. Empirical analysis 
We now confront the hypotheses formulated in Section 2 with data from Dutch 
municipalities. Not all municipalities will be examined. In some municipalities 
one political party has a majority of seats in the municipal council. In that case 
the outcome of the formation process cannot be predicted significantly by 
coalition theories, because the result is solely determined by this actor. Munic- 
ipalities with such a 'dictator' are excluded from our analysis. This concerns 
284 cases in 1978 (%YO), 105 in 1982 (Id%), and 94 in 1986 (13%). 
5.1 Size oriented models and the dominant player principle 
Size oriented models and the dominant player principle can be tested for the 
municipalities without a dictator.26 The empirical results are presented in 
Table 1. Columns 1 to 8 provide results for coalition formations after the 1986 
elections. For columns 1 to 7, the identity of the represented political parties 
has been exclusively determined by the party membership of Aldermen. 
The first column gives the success rates for the various models. The weak 
domination version of the dominant player principle (Hypothesis 9) appears to 
have the highest success rate, that is 82%. However, as stated in Section 4, this 
percentage does not provide a valid insight into the predictive power of a 
theory. This becomes clear if the success rate is compared with the Z-value, 
and when one takes notice of the expected number of correct predictions 
(1 pi), which is stated in the third column, in comparison with the absolute 
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number of correct predictions (c si) given in the second column. The principle 
turns out to have a relatively high number of correct predictions (285), which 
determines the large value of the success rate, but also a high expected number 
of correct predictions (233). This leads to a relatively small Z-value (column 
4). Although this Z-score is still significant, other models with smaller success 
rates provide better predictions (see, for instance, the minimum number 
principle). 
The null-hypothesis, meaning that the expected number of correct pre- 
dictions is larger or equal to the number of correct predictions, has to be 
rejected for most hypotheses. An exception is the minimum size principle, 
which does not have a significant result. An objection, however, is that the 
limited number of Aldermen in small municipalities may have distorted these 
results. Therefore, columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1 present results reported for 
municipalities with two, three and four or more Aldermen. As expected, the 
size oriented models seem to predict better in the group with two Aldermen, 
but this result is merely caused by the limited number of available positions. 
This becomes clear if these Z-values are compared with the values found for 
the other two groups. In all cases those values are lower or are not significant. 
As indicated in column 7 of Table 1 the minimum size principle and its 
combinations with the dominant player principle have to be rejected as pre- 
dictive principles. Also the weak domination version of the dominant player 
principle does not provide a significant explanation. Moreover, as expected, 
this version is less significant than the strong version of the dominant player 
principle, which does give significant results. 
Especially the minimum number principle and its combinations with the 
dominant player principle are highly significant. The relatively precise pre- 
dictions of this actor-oriented model, together with its combinations with some 
of the behavioral models, are in line with the expectation that the bargaining 
position of political parties is important for formation processes in local 
government in the Netherlands. Moreover, as expected, combinations of the 
dominant player principle and size oriented models hold higher Z-values than 
those models separately. 
In column 8, results are presented for the set-up that uses the party member- 
ship of Aldermen as well as the Mayor to determine the participating parties in 
the coalition that is formed. The results for this variant appear to be less 
significant than for the computations based on Aldermen alone (see column 
7). This indicates that, in most municipalities, political parties most likely do 
not reckon with the political affiliation of the Mayor when calculating the 
representation of parties in the governing coalition. The same can be conclud- 
ed for the municipalities with two or three Aldermen. The statistics for these 
cases are not presented here. 
Finally, columns 9 and 10 of Table 1 present results for coalition formations 
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after the elections in 1978 and 1982. These results can be compared with the 
results for the 1986 elections presented in column 7. From these columns some 
interesting changes can be noticed. First, the minimum winning principle gives 
significant predictions for the outcome of the formation processes after the 
elections in 1982 and 1986, while this principle does not hold significant results 
for 1978. In the case of the minimum number principle a similar tendency is 
noticed in the sense that the significant Z-values for 1982 and 1986 are much 
higher than for 1978. Second, predictions of the dominant player principle 
(Hypothesis 10) turn out to be significant for all studied elections. Combined 
with the minimum winning and the minimum number principle these pre- 
dictions are even better. Again, the highest Z-values, and, thus, the best 
predictions, are found for the dominated minimum number principle. 
5.2 Policy oriented models and the central player principle 
In order to  test the policy oriented models and the central player principle 
municipalities are excluded that have local lists represented in the municipal 
council for more than 20% of the seats. Moreover, if a local list is represented 
in the Council of Mayor and Aldermen the municipality is also excluded. 
The empirical results are presented in Table 2. Columns 1 to 5 give the 
results for the 1986 elections. D’66 is now ordered to the right of PvdA 
(ordering 1) as well as in columns 6 and 7. Further, in columns 1 to 4 coalition 
members are determined by the political membership of Aldermen alone. 
Results are provided for three subsets of municipalities. As in the case of 
size oriented models and the dominant player principle, the limited number of 
Aldermen in small municipalities distorts the empirical results especially in 
favour of the minimum diversity principle, the minimum range principle and 
the dominant central player principle. Therefore, the attention in this section 
is also focused on municipalities with four or more Aldermen. 
From column 4 in Table 2 it appears that for 1986 the minimum diversity 
principle, the subjective policy distance principle, the central player principle 
and the dominant central player principle have to be rejected as predictive 
theories. None of these models gives a significant result. The other models 
have significant Z-values, but these values are rather low compared with 
results found in Section 5.1. 
The results based on Aldermen alone can be compared with the variant for 
which coalitions are also determined by the political affiliation of the Mayor 
(see column 5). For this variant most Z-values turn out to be smaller, which 
confirms our earlier conclusion that political parties probably do not reckon 
with the Mayor’s party membership. 
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 present results for coalition formations after the 
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elections in 1978 and 1982. These results can be compared with the results for 
the 1986 elections given in column 4. It turns out that most principles, if they 
have significant results for 1982 or 1986, do not hold significant predictions for 
1978. The central player principle, however, has a significant Z-values for 
1982, but for 1986 and 1978 the predictions of this principle are not significant. 
One reason for this instability of the results, and more generally the dis- 
appointing results of the policy oriented models, is perhaps the ordering of 
political parties. If this ordering is false, these models may not predict the 
formed coalition correctly. An alternative ordering of political parties is 
proposed in Section 3.3 with respect to D’66. Instead of a policy position 
between PvdA and CDA, D’66 is ordered to the left of PvdA (ordering 2). The 
results of this analysis, presented in column 8 , 9  and 10 of Table 2, are striking. 
The minimum range principle and the minimum diversity principle have very 
significant results, also for 1978. So, from an empirical point of view D’66 is 
likely to be found at the left side of PvdA (ordering 2) and not at its right side 
(ordering 1). An exception is the policy distance theory, which still is in- 
significant. 
The relatively precise predictions of some of the policy oriented models 
were not expected. Policy considerations appear to play a more important role 
in local coalition formation. Also note that the change of the position of D’66 
especially affects models that stress the ideological cohesiveness of coalitions. 
5.3  Comparison 
The best size oriented models, policy oriented models and actor oriented 
models are confronted with each other in Table 3. The results presented in this 
table are computed for the same population, ordering D’66 to the left of PvdA 
(ordering 2). Models not included in the table do not yield significant pre- 
dictions for two or more election periods. These models, such as the minimum 
size principle and the subjective policy distance theory, are rejected as pre- 
dictive theories in the case of Dutch municipalities. 
The most successful models are the size-oriented and dominant player 
approaches, and their derivatives. An exception is, of course, the (rejected) 
minimum size principle. This result is remarkable for several reasons. First, 
Denters (1985: 302) concluded that none of the models he tested yields 
significant predictions. Clearly, this result is mainly due to the incorrect test 
statistic that was used. Some of the models rejected by Denters do give 
significant results. Second, size oriented models predict governing coalitions 
nearly as precisely as some of the policy oriented models. Thus, Franklin and 
Mackie’s (1984: 686) observation that policy considerations dominate Dutch 
national cabinet formation is not confirmed for the local level. Also non-policy 
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benefits of coalition formation appear to matter in local government. This 
result provides some support for our expectation that different models may 
perform better depending on the institutional setting. 
The more recent models, such as the dominant player principle and the 
central player principle, have varying results. The weak domination version of 
the dominant player principle is rejected as a predictive theory. The central 
player principle and the dominant player principle27 have significant results 
and, especially, combinations of the dominant player principle with some of 
the size oriented models provide rather precise predictions. The dominant 
minimum size principle, recently suggested by Van Deemen (1989: 325-8), 
showed to be a poor predictor and is, therefore, rejected. 
The hypothesis with the highest Z-values for 1978 as well as for 1982 is the 
dominated minimum number principle. This success provides evidence in 
favour of our expectation that preferences and bargaining power matter in 
formation processes at the local level in the Netherlands. Some of the policy 
oriented models also provide significant results, but in general these models 
are less precise. 
Finally, two comments can be made regarding the empirical performance of 
the models. First, as Table 3 showed, the relative number of correct predictions 
Table 3. Predicted coalitions measured by the party membership of Aldermen for municipalities 
with four or more Aldermen: comparison of significant models for the same population. D’66 
ordered to the left of PvdA (success rates between brackets) 
Hypothesis 1978 1982 1986 
1 .  Minimum winning principle 
3. Minimum number principle 
0.94 (35%) 
2.22 (33%) 
4. Minimum range principle: ordinal version 3.65*(31%) 
5. Minimum range principle: interval version 3.77*(30%) 
6. Minimum diversity principle 3.77* (30%) 
1.31 (51%) 
4.2 1 * (99%) 
1.09 (52%) 
10. Dominant player principle” 
11 .  Central player principle” 
12. Dominant central player principle” 
13. Weakly dominated minimum winning 
14. Dominated minimum winning principle” 
17. Weakly dominated minimum number 
18. Dominated minimum number principle” 
principle” 4.38*(43%) 
4.16*(41%) 
principle” 4.70*(40%) 
4.70*(40%) 
Number of cases (97) 
3.14*(36%) 
5.59*(32%) 
4.72’ (25%) 
5.52 * (24%) 
5.17 * (23%) 
2.28 (47%) 
4.02* (96%) 
2.40* (57%) 
4.64* (36% ) 
4.36*(34%) 
5.91 *(34%) 
5.91 *(34%) 
(104) 
3.80*(43%) 
6.53 * (42 Yo ) 
6.25 * (36%) 
7.1 O* (34% ) 
7. I,?* (34%) 
4.27*(64%) 
1.83 (goo/,) 
3.68*(69%) 
5.72*(46%) 
5.72* (46% ) 
6.65 * (45 Yo) 
6.65 * (45%) 
(99) 
a For the central player principle, the dominant player principle and their combinations success 
rates are computed for municipalities for which a political party is central to the policy ordering or 
it  dominates or weakly dominates one or more coalitions. 
*Significant at the 1% level (critical Z-value: 2.33). 
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of the dominated minimum number principle is rather limited. The values vary 
between 34% for 1982 and 45% for 1986. Other principles, such as the central 
player principle, have much higher success rates, but these models are less 
precise in their predictions as the lower Z-values indicate. Second, the pre- 
dictions of coalition theories can be compared with a ‘prediction’ based on the 
status quo, that is the composition of the Council of Mayor and Aldermen in 
the ‘preceding’ period. Using the coalitions formed after the 1982 elections as 
predictors for the coalition formations in 1986, this simple ‘rule of thumb’ has a 
significant Z-value of 16.41 and a success rate of 48%. This result is far more 
precise than the dominant minimum number principle and any other tested 
coalition model. Thus, although the predictions of most coalition models 
proved to be statistically significant, their performance is still rather poor. 
6. Conclusions 
The paper analyzes coalition formation in Dutch local governments in which 
political parties represented in the municipal council have to form a municipal 
executive committee from among their members. Contrary to national cabinet 
formations in the Netherlands, no ‘formateur’ is appointed, and political 
parties directly bargain to be included in the local coalition, that is, the Council 
of Mayor and Aldermen. The empirical analysis leads to the following conclu- 
sions: 
(1) The formation process in Dutch municipalities can be typified as an 
‘unrestricted’ formation process. All represented political parties are allowed 
to propose some coalition, and none is formally excluded from this process. 
Therefore, models which emphasize the strategic position of a player are 
expected to perform better in this context than other models. This implication 
is only partly confirmed. The dominant player principle, as well as the central 
player principle, provide significant predictions for most formation processes, 
but some of the size or  policy oriented models are at least as significant (for 
example, the minimum number principle or  the minimum range principle). 
Also preferences appear to be important in addition to bargaining strength. 
Moreover, the weak domination version of the dominant player principle is 
mainly insignificant and is rejected as a predictive theory. 
The insignificance of the weak domination version can be the result of its 
limited concept of power. Contrary to the stronger version, the only require- 
ment of this principle is that the dominant player also can form a winning 
coalition with parties with which the internal opposition can win. So, if the 
internal opposition tries to form a coalition with some party, the dominant 
player can also make him an offer. If the dominant player is not able to form a 
winning coalition with some party, the internal opposition cannot too, if their 
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coalition is weakly dominated. Thus, in case of weak domination the dominant 
player and the internal opposition have the same opportunities to form a 
coalition with other players. The stronger version provides the dominant 
player much more bargaining strength. Then, he also can form a winning 
coalition with parties with which the internal opposition cannot win. 
(2) As well as their strategic position, the preferences of political parties may 
be important for coalition formation. Motivations stressed by the more tradi- 
tional size and policy oriented models are expected to be useful in combination 
with actor oriented models, as when the dominant player principle is combined 
with the minimum winning principle and its extensions. The central player 
principle, which already emphasizes policy preferences and strategic consid- 
erations, is combined with the dominant player principle. Do these ‘mixed’ 
theories provide better predictions? 
The dominated minimum number principle provides very significant results 
and some evidence in favour of our expectation. The same holds for the 
dominated minimum winning principle. The dominated minimum size princi- 
ple,  however, performs rather poorly. The insignificant results of this principle 
seem to be due to a more general failure of the minimum size principle to 
explain coalition formation at the municipal level. With respect to policy 
preferences, the minimum range principle and the minimum diversity princi- 
ple yield better results than the central player principle and the dominated 
central player principle. So, the expected performance of ‘mixed’ models is 
only confirmed for size oriented models. 
(3) Size considerations are expected to be more appropriate than policy 
considerations in the context of Dutch local government. The main reason is 
the dependence of local governments on the central government leading to a 
mainly ‘national’ orientation of voters at local elections. As expected, some of 
the policy oriented models appear to predict coalition formation rather poorly, 
especially the subjective policy distance theory, which is rejected. Contrary to 
our expectation, however, the minimum range principle and the minimum 
diversity principle provide rather precise predictions. 
A possible explanation for this result is the fact that, in the Netherlands, the 
three largest parties are located in the centre of the distribution of voter 
preferences. Winning coalitions of CDA and PvdA, or CDA and VVD do not 
contain an unnecessary player and have the smallest number of parties. 
Moreover, these coalitions are of minimum range or diversity if D’66 is 
ordered to the left of PvdA (see ordering 2).”Thus, the presence of these large 
centre parties in most municipal councils is compatible with both size and 
policy oriented approaches to coalition formation. If, however, the policy 
position of D’66 is located to the right of PvdA (ordering l),  a coalition of 
CDA and PvdA may not be ideologically cohesive anymore. Now, the results 
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of the minimum range and the minimum diversity principles are less significant 
or  even insignificant, given the presence of D’66 in many municipal councils. 
(4) The empirical results are computed for several types of situation. First, 
as expected, the results appear to be distorted in the smallest municipalities, 
with only two Aldermen. Although most size oriented models predict well for 
these cases, the highly significant results disappear in larger municipalities 
with more Aldermen. Therefore, in the remaining part of the paper our 
attention has been focused on the municipalities with four or more Aldermen. 
Second, if the political affiliation of the Mayor is taken into account, the 
empirical results turn out to be less significant. This effect indicates that in 
most municipalities political parties probably do not reckon with the Mayor’s 
party membership in forming a coalition. This result may have been caused by 
the more or  less independent position of the Mayor in the Netherlands and the 
incapacity of local councils to discharge the Mayor formally. Third, for D’66 
two different policy orderings are tested. If D’66 is ordered to the left of PvdA 
all policy oriented models provide more significant predictions. 
The analysis in this paper gives rise to several questions, which can be regarded 
as topics for further research: 
(1) In this paper the ordering of local political parties is derived from an 
ordering of national parties. It is, however, not clear whether this ordering is 
accurate. Further, because of their unknown policy positions, local lists are 
neglected in the analysis. In order to extend the analysis to a larger number of 
cases with regard to policy oriented models, it is necessary to pay attention to 
the positions of these parties. An analysis of local party manifestos can throw 
light on both matters. In addition, a one-dimensional policy ordering is as- 
sumed, though this assumption also needs to be further investigated. If more 
than one dimension is important in the case of local politics, and if local parties 
are ordered differently from one municipality to another, then the policy 
oriented models may hold different and perhaps more significant results. 
(2) The dominant minimum number principle appears to provide the best 
predictions, though this does not imply that other models are not worth 
considering. It would be interesting to explore the dominant minimum number 
principle in combination with, for instance, policy oriented models. Further- 
more, the structure of the formation processes at the national as well as the 
local level of government needs to be modelled more explicitly. As indicated, 
the institutional arrangements of national or local politics may affect coalition 
formation differently. Not all political parties may have access to the ‘arena of 
coalition formation’, and some player may have a special position, as is the 
case at the national level in the Netherlands. The empirical analysis in this 
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paper provides some evidence in favour of an institutional approach, but much 
work still has to be done. 
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Notes 
1. Denters used a test statistic that resembles the oneTaylor & Laver have suggested without the 
correction for discontinuity. As in Section 4 will be noticed this statistic only gives a very rough 
or even incorrect approach of significance. 
2. Various aspects of the Dutch political system are dealt with in a special issue of Wesf European 
Polifics: Politics in the Netherlands: How Much Change? (1989, 12: 1-185). This issue also 
contains an extensive bibliography of publications on Dutch politics written in English. 
3. See for a more extensive survey on the position of the Mayor in the Dutch local political 
system and his appointment by the central government: Andeweg & Derksen (1978). 
4. In the empirical part of this paper hypotheses are conceived as attempts to predict correctly as 
many coalitions as possible. Although all formed coalitions should be predicted correctly from 
a strictly deterministic point of view, each theory is probably not complete, leading to 
deviations from the formulated principle. 
5. Although Riker is mentioned as one of the proposers of this hypothesis, his argument does not 
imply a minimum size principle as De Swaan (1973: 52-62) noted. What is missing is an 
assumption about the distribution of benefits in Riker’s theory. So this theory predicts 
minimum winning coalitions instead of minimum size coalitions. 
6. For multi-dimensional models and the problem of an empty core, see Schofield, Grofman & 
Feld (1988). 
7. If the weights of parties I and j ,  i, j E N, are not equal, w(i) # w( j ) ,  a simple game is called a 
weighted majority game. 
8. See Peleg (1981: 17-8). This condition is not investigated following the interpretation of the 
dominant player used by Van Deemen. 
9. A proof of this principle is comparable to Van Deemen’s proof of the dominated minimum 
size principle. 
10. The maximum number of represented political parties is 10. The minimum of two parties is 
found in only 0.6% of the municipalities. 
11. Other national parties that are represented in municipalities are Democrats 1966 (D’66), 
Radical Party (PPR), Pacifist Party (PSP), Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), 
Socialist Party (SP), conservative Christian parties such as GPV, SGP and RPF, and the 
extremist Center Party (CP) and Farmers Party (BP). 
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12. The Netherlands Bureau of Statistics classifies these lists as Independents, Roman Catholic 
Lists and local Protestant Christian Lists. 
13. Exceptions are, of course, foreign and European policies, stabilization or macroeconomic 
policies of the central government, and, to some extent, policies regarding the distribution of 
secondary income. 
14. Only identical orderings are expected. Let A < B < C < D be the ordering of the political 
parties A, B, C and D (’<’ means ‘more to the left than’). If, for instance, party B is not 
represented in a municipal council the following ordering with regard to the parties A, C and 
D is used: A < C < D. Using the minimum diversity principle the coalition {A, D} has an 
ID = 3 (two spaces, one hole) and not an ID = 5. Further, the same coalition has a value of ‘2’ 
and not of ‘3’ if the interval version of the minimum range principle is used. 
15. These expectations will be tested in a recently started research project on the dimensionality 
of Dutch local politics. 
16. This ordering resembles in most cases orderings of political parties based on perceptions of 
voters (see Van der Eijk & Niemoller, 1983: 249), perceptions of members of the Dutch 
House of Commons (see Daalder & Van de Geer, 1977: 334-339) and ‘expert’ opinions (see 
Castles & Mair, 1984: 80). See also the ordering proposed by De Swaan (1982: 224). A survey 
of older research on party positions is found in De Swaan’s earlier study (1973: 242-5). The 
position of SP is determined using their party manifesto for the national election in 1981 (see 
Lipschits, 1981). Further, the numbers below the policy scale are used to determine the range 
of a coalition for the interval version of the minimum range theory. 
17. After the 1978 elections CDA (a combination of KVP, CHU and ARP) as well as its joining 
parties KVP, CHU and ARP are represented in municipal councils. The ‘Catholic People’s 
Party’ (KVP), the ‘Christian Historical Union’ (CHU) and the ‘ Anti-Revolutionary Party’ 
(ARP), and various combinations of these parties, are attributed to the policy position of 
CDA. 
18. It is questionable, however, whether democracy-related issues can be interpreted as elements 
of a ‘social economic’ dimension. 
19. A similar problem occurs in Dittrich’s study for the ‘Democratic Socialists ’70’ (DS’70), which 
are not represented in municipal councils. Normally this party is ordered between CDA and 
W D  on the social economic dimension (see for example De Swaan, 1982: 224). Its position 
for the 1978 election is between D’66 and CDA according to the first factor, and the party is 
situated on the right side of VVD if the second and less important factor is used (interpreted as 
a modernization versus traditionalism dimension). This result also indicates that Dittrich’s 
first factor can hardly be interpreted in social economic terms alone. Thus, it is not clear which 
‘dimension’ is actually represented by this factor. 
20. With regard to the trend, the first derivative changes from a positive value into a negative one 
for the first time at roughly 20%. Beyond this point the marginal increase of the number of 
cases decreases if the relative number of seats of local lists is increased until these parties have 
a proportion of roughly 90%. 
21. The empirical results appear to be rather insensitive to these criteria. 
22. Success rates are simply the number of correct predictions divided by the number of predicted 
cases. 
23. Blalock adds to this proposition the following condition for the binomial distribution: x p ,  > 5 
where 
24. Thus, the test statistic confronts population parameters and not population estimations based 
on a sample with the total number of correct predictions or successes. 
25. A one-tailed test is chosen because we would like to know whether the correct number of 
predictions based on a specific theory is greater than expected. 
26. In contrast to policy oriented models and the central player principle (see section 5.2) it is not 
p ,  < x (I-p,) (see Blalock, 1972: 195-6). 
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necessary to exclude municipalities with a substantial proportion of local lists from the 
analyzed population. Data on the political representation in municipal councils as well as the 
representation of parties in the Council of Mayor and Aldermen are published by the 
Netherlands Bureau of Statistics (1978,1982,1986), the Union of Netherlands Municipalities 
(1982,1986) and as ‘Politiek Memo’ by Kluwer (1978,1983, 1986). To determine the kind of a 
local party (national or local list), to trace the participating members of a combination of local 
branches of national parties, and to establish the number of seats of these parties these three 
sources are compared. If one of the publications shows a difference, an identical classification 
of the other two sources is adhered to. Should, nevertheless, a contradiction still exists, the 
municipality concerned is asked to supply additional information. 
27. Note. however, that for the restricted population used in Table 3 the dominant player 
principle is not significant for 1982 and 1978. If all municipalities without dictatorial parties are 
used. the predictions of this principle are significant (see Table 1, columns 7, 9 and 10). 
28. The less common coalition of PvdA and VVD is also a minimum winning and a minimum 
number coalition, but it  does not fulfill the requirement of a minimum range or a minimum 
diversity coalition given the possibility of a coalition {CDA, PvdA} or {CDA, VVD}. 
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